DO's and DONT's in Biometrics

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HYDRA
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Danish Biometrics
Research Project Consortium

PRIWAY
Security in Context
www.priway.com

Danish Biometrics

Danish Product Award 2007
Ingeniøren
TRADE AWARD
IT

RFIDsec
www.rfidsec.com

Strategic Advisory Board
EU ICT Security &
Dependability Taskforce
www.securitytaskforce.eu

Biometrics has played, and will increasingly play an important
role in crime forensics and in non-repudiation but also for self-protection and proving innocence **What is critically important is to recognise that the goal should not be identification and surveillance, but the balance of security needs**.For instance biometrics is problematic for use for authentication as the **"secret key" is not secret, revocable or unique** – biometrics can be spoofed and victims of identity theft cannot get a new set of biometrics, and using several spoofable biometrics can merely create more "fake security".

Empowerment considerations involve ensuring that the use of biometrics is Identity and key management is based on easily and **securely revocable keys** such as **privacy biometrics** (integration of biometrics characteristics in mobile tamper-resistant reader-devices) or **bio-cryptography** (integration of biometrics characteristics in revocable cryptography keys) while enabling the use of a plurality of identity schemes. Indeed, **Empowerment and dependability are not achievable if control is always with someone else and attacks commit identity theft based on faking biometric credentials.**

ICAO Passport & EU VISA
in clear VIOLATION

Source: www.securitytaskforce.org - Recommendations, p. 14

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7 Rules of Biometrics Security

1. Ensure upgrade ability - Change is the only certain Aspect

2. Ensure Fallback – Never collect non-revocable biometrics

3. Purpose Specification – Mix with purpose specific secrets

4. Proportionality – Exhaust non-invasive security tools first

5. Minimize Interdependence - User Control and revocable id

6. Semantic Interoperability – Don't standardise at technology

7. Design assuming failure – Critical infrastructure fault tolerance

Without changing our pattern of thought, we will not be able to solve the problems we created with our current patterns of thought.
Albert Einstein

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PRIWAY
Security in Context

Privacy is security
from the point of view of a single stakeholder

Multi-stakeholder
Balance is needed
in transactions.

Risk Minimisation
Purpose specification
and revokability.

Application Specific
Context determine
Security requirements.

No Security without Privacy
If breach of your security breach security of others

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Trust ::   **the amount of Risk willingly accepted in a given context**

Citizens make subjective rational choices

Price / Risk
Loss of control

Product / Service
Comfort / values

Nobody "wants surveillance" - they want bad guys caught, but nobody likes to be controlled

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What is a PET?

A Privacy Enhancing technology or PET
is a technology or system
enabling citizen security and control
that **breaks the assumption
of zero-sum trade-offs**
Freedom vs. Security, Sharing vs. Privacy

A PET will make Pareto improvements
E.g. facilitate data sharing.
value creation or mitigate risks
without creating interdependance
and accumulating threats
to citizens and systems

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Security/Privacy NOT Zero-sum Priway Identity Model

PRIWAY
Security in Context

√ Mutual Trust
√ Crime prevention
√ Semantic Id

√ Fallback Security
√ Privacy & Trust
√ Enforcing Rights

Virtual Identities
(Trust Enabling)

Security for Citizen

Anonymity
(Privacy Enhancing)

Identification
(Control enhancing)

Security against Citizen

Weak Security

Non-Identified

Identified

Non-Traceabillity   Traceabillity

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
7

Biometrics – basic problems

Biometrics used for Identification without user control

- Only one set of keys
- Cannot be secrets
- Only approximate
- Spoofable, not revocable

Create crime / Identity Theft
- Reverse of Burden of proof
- Provide proof you are another
- Planting evidences etc.

Undermine Data Security
- Linkable across context
- No consent without alternatives
- No purpose specification

Security disaster
- Create uncontrollable risk
- Make balances impossible
- No recovery from failure

Rethink – critical need for security and two-way revocability!
Different challenges: Root ID, Id Device mgt, threat escalation, post-crime forensics

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Security Tools available

Available or soon available

- Anonymous Credentials
  - Certified profile & attribute data
  - E.g. Credentica

- Identity metasystem
  - Heterogeneous id environment
  - E.g. Microsoft

- Private Biometrics & Biometric encryption
  - Client-side Biometrics
  - E.g. readers on card

- Anonymisers
  - Mixnets / onion routing
  - E.g. TOR, ANON

- Hardware-traceability
  - Verifiable accountability
  - E.g. TCG

"Privacy Highway" inventions

- Secure RFID with PET
  - RFID with privacy control
  - Anti-counterfeiting & Anti-theft

- Non-linkable Digital Payment
  - Anti-counterfeit, Anti-theft,
  - Anti-laundering, Credit, additional

- Citizen Id Cards - Anti-Identity Theft
  - Create & manage new ids to context
  - Traceable & accountable to Root Id
  - Privacy Authentication
  - Instant revocation
  - Id Accountability negotiation

- Other
  - Receiver-controlled Communication
  - Indirect means to e.g. control Cameras
  - GRID Context Security

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Priway Identity Model
Roadmap to PETs & Biometrics

PRIWAY
Security in Context

Government block
market by promoting
& buying surveillance

Government block here
Central Command &
Control Paradigm fail
to recognice needs

National Id
2.0

PETs
with anti-
crime

Revokable
Biometrics

Security for
Individual

PETs
Mixnets

On-card
match

Security against
Citizen

PGP

Biometrics ID
& Surveillance

Photo Id
National Id 1.0

Basic
Internet

Human
Recognition

Non-Identified

Identified

Non-Traceability

Traceabillity

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Problem # 1 - Security erode

Distrust
**Growing
"Risk Premium"**

More "ab"use
of personal data

More and larger
Security Failures

More Crime
Identity Theft

Collection of
Personal Data

Non-trustworthy
Risk accumulation
Failure of Critical
infrastructure

More identification

More
"Security"

Root problem
Identification
create risk !

Identification Credentials
E.g. biometrics spoofing.
More Identity Theft and
Reverse burden of proof

Business
Silos
Id as
Property

Pervasive surveillance
And abuse of surveillance
"Criminals can do everything
government can do"

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PRIWAY
Security in Context

Radio-update

Assume deployment of

- A series of small RFID-bombs
- Attached to passive RF-reader
- Located at fashionable locations
- Close to normal RFID-reader
- Triggers updated via FM-radio
- **Proximity-triggered by target**

NEW – Bioemtrics or Face Recognition version tapping into any camera & advertising sign.

Busines case – Bombs for hire

Highly scalable business model, bombs dispersed in major Cities near parliaments. We will get your man in 10 days.

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Loading the Gun #2
Attacks emerging, more later

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Security in Context

- US force Iraqis to enroll in a biometric Id system without Citizen Control. Risk is ethnic cleansing.

  – Is US guilty of aiding Genocide if this happens?

  – What is the security difference to EU plans?

- ICAO Passports have bad security, collection of biometrics and no fallback. Risk are attacks, identity spoofing, data security failures etc.

  – What do we do when the ICAO setup fails?

- Italien and Greek wiretapping scandals using inside abuse of surveillance weapons

- MS voice recognition spoofed by system speaker

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No automated Identification !

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Security in Context

1. Challenge → 2. Challenge

**Targeting
Reusing Id**

Mafia Fraud Attack
Relay Attack

4. Response ← 3. Response

Log

5. Biometric
Verification

"Secure Chip"/
Shipment Id

"Trusted"
Person

**Triggering
User not involved**

**Id Theft
Foreign reader**

**Tracking
No log security**

Central control is zero security

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Biometric Surveillance Assaults on society in progress

- The Security perspective – Overkill and legacy
  - Biometrics surveillance - overkill without balances or fallback
  - Question is NOT Security or anti-Crime – but how to get both.

- The Digital Economy Perspective – Digital Polution
  - Can be compared with the environment question – EITHER production OR Environment – lead to disaster
  - Today we know we need enzymes, catalysts and sustainability

- The rights perspective - a Camera is a gun
  - At gun-point, you have a right to disarm removing threats
  - If you see others in emergency, you are obligated to aid

- The Innovation Perspective – Who's preferences?
  - In the old days, suppliers listened to customers servicing customer needs
  - Unless careful, in the future suppliers will identify customers pushing supplier wants

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
Biometrics and interoperability

SAME as old biometrics:
Convenient
Customisable/Inclusive
Traceable
Visible inspection

User Interface
incl. Pin/passwords

But ALSO:
Security / Privacy
Purpose Specific
Upgradeable
Interoperable
Plurality

Revocable secrets

Can be either
Private Biometrics/Encryption
Simple on-card-match

Any
Protocol
Cryptographic
Identity Model

Client-side
Biometrics
Collection
ONLY

Tamper resistent User Device
Entire Card must be revocable

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VISA 1:N Check
DO NOT REQUIRE
IDENTIFICATION

(User control of activation & passport revocation)

5. Re-encrypted Data

Border Control

Passport
RFID with Zeroleak™
Encrypted data segment

4. Request Data

3. Session decryption key
(to public key)

2. Activate + temporary
session decryption key

1. Establish Context
   Present Public key
   Request Authentication

Passport lockdown built-in
No exchange of
non-revokable biometrics
needed – VISA can be
added as blinded certificate
No 1:N needed

User Device 1st Gen
On-card biometrics
"Zero-knowledge" protocol
RFID Owner key + Data Decryption key

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Problem # 2
PETs critical for innovation

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Security in Context

Surveillance societý   versus   **PET world**

Who "own" customer?   Demand-driven innovation

● Consumer   **Demand Pull**

Profile marketing
Cross-context data
Collection and use   ● Retailer   Servicing Needs

Purpose-specific sharing
Value network sourcing

● Distributor

Supply Push   ● Manufacturer   Mass customisation

9-9.9 out of 10
new products fail   Customer force focus
on actual needs
& gradual improvements

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User-controlled Biometrics

4. Identity Revocation

Government can revoke Root Identity
Citizen can revoke context id & devices

3. Identity Recognition

On-card Biometrics authentication

2. Context Identity

User-controlled ONLY !!!!
On-card Biometrics authentication
Possible Biometric Encryption

Only use to create

User control of Device & Channel Management

1. Root Identity

Prevent terrorist dual enrolment
Enable Vitness relocation & police Undercover
NEVER collect non-revokable biometrics

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Semantic Resolution of Security Semantic Interoperability !!

PR!WAY
Security in Context

Id negotiated and customised to context
Can be recognised / reused

Incl dynamic reponses to
external alerts
E.g terrorthreat

Semantic
Identity

Virtualisation
Enrolment
Authentication
Accountability
Positive Credentials
Negative Credentials

⟺

**Dynamic
Security Resolution
and negotiation towards**

Application Risk Profile

No need for surveillance until specific
threat do not respond to requests using
Non-invasive means

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eGovernment id model

Scandinavian Challenge:
Move from Single National Id
To Context id

General Challenge:
Damand Pull
Effectivisation
AND
security

Trust-focused eGovernment

Scandinavia

UK, Germany US

Structured Unstructured

Multi-Id

Single Id

Identity model

Risk
Concentration
Citizen Demand Pull

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to solve the problems we created with our current patterns of thought.*
Albert Einstein

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Summation

- **Biometrics can be a disaster OR better security for all**
  - The strength of biometrics is also its source of certain failure
  - Ensure revocability at all levels - critical for biometrics to work
  - Purpose-specific Id, Open Semantic resolution & interoperability

- **We need BOTH stronger traceability AND empowerment**
  - PETs MUST be supported already in ID Cards – Citizen Id
  - User devices facilitating Trust in Id & key management
  - Can be made to support multiple models in parallel

- **Strong and urgent need for re-adjusting policies**
  - Justice: Stop distorting security markets and blocking innovation
  - Technology: Include interoperability, empowerment and fallback
  - Tear DOWN those Digital Walls – ICAO Passports & VISA fail

Mr. Frattini – Europe cannot afford these mistakes !!

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Questions?

From Central Command & Control to Citizen Empowerment & Dependability

Use non-invasive mechanisms maintaining post-transaction balances.
Only activate Surveillance when a specific threat is detected

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Security in context

.. because the alternative is not an option

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