Security in Context

EU Conference on Security Research 2007 Security, Innovation and Technology

From Central Command & Control to Citizen Empowerment & Dependability

Stephan J. Engberg Priway





http://www.hydra.eu.com

Strategic Advisory Board EU ICT Security & Dependability Taskforce

www.securitytaskforce.eu

Agenda



- 1. Burning Platform security paradigm sustainability
 - Crime & abuse is escalating BECAUSE of the security paradigm
- 2. Disarming the conflict how deep is the rabbit hole?
 - Sustainable principles for Identity & Security top-down principles
- 3. Designing for Trustworthiness & Innovation
 - Distributed Empowerment Passports and Emergency cases

PRIWAY Security in Context

Root Issue

- The root conflict
 - Protecting the citizen from others
 - Protecting others from the citizen
- When does this balance tip?
 - When it tips can we be certain to get access?
 - If so, how can we be certain it not abused?
- New protections emerging
 - All-edge wireless routing, strong encryption on top of weak encryption, steganography hidden channels, identity lending/renting
- Fact about back doors we cannot secure NOR assure them


The Security Death Spiral



More "ab"use of personal data

More and larger Security Failures

More Crime Identity Theft




Biometric Id & Surveillance More Identity Theft and Reverse burden of proof

Business
Silos
Id as
Property

Pervasive surveillance And abuse of surveillance "Criminals can do everything government can do" Targets as triggers

Criminals as professionals





BOTNETs – Separation of Motives and Capabilities!

PRIWAY Security in Context

Biometrics - wake up

Biometrics used for Identification without user control

- Only approximate
- Publishing "passwords"
- By definition spoofable
- Cannot be revoked



Create crime / Identity Theft

- Reverse of Burden of proof
- More only worsen the problem
- Lack plausible deniability



Destroy Data Security

- Linkable across context
- Does NOT ensure consent
- Can only have one id/key





Deterministic failure

- Create uncontrollable risk
- Make Empowerment impossible
- Make Dependability impossible
- Likely fail 100% -> Feudalism

The ONLY secure Biometrics - is user-controlled!

Reserve for Root ID, Id Device mgt, threat escalation, post-crime forensics

Security in Context

No automated Identification



1. Challenge 2. Challenge

Targeting Reusing Id

Mafia Fraud Attack

Relay Attack



"Trusted

"Secure Chip"/ Shipment Id

Triggering User not involved



5. Biometric Verification



Id Theft Foreign reader



Central control is zero security


Surveillance kills! CASE – Ambient Smart Bombs



Assume deployment of

- A series of small RFID-bombs
- Attached to passive RF-reader
- Located at fashionable locations
- Close to normal RFID-reader
- EPC-triggers updated via FM-radio
- Proximity-triggered by target

NEW – Bluetooth or Face Recognition version tapping into any camera & advertising sign.




Busines case – Bombs for hire

Highly scalable business model, bombs dispersed in major Cities near near parlaments. Will get your man in 10 days.

OBS: Frenchaise available – free guidelines – winner will get 50%!!!


The Security Gap of Central Command & Control





Empowerment & Fallback security Key to National Id trustworthiness





Security in Context


Trust Socio/Economics

Trust = Amount of (perceived) Risk willingly accepted in a context

trust

Direct linkage between risk model and behaviour

- Citizens want:
 - Convenience / usability
 - Value for money
 - Control (no risk)
- Citizens evaluate, trade & learn
 - Reality catches up
 - More risk = less business
 - Context Id = Demand-pull



Perceived Risk

Empowerment -> Security, Growth & Demand-driven innovation

Conclusion: DESIGN for Empowerment!

From Identification to Context Specific Adaptable Identity



Use of biometrics

Forensics

Citizen pre-stored

4. Identity Revocation

No - Specific Keys

3. Identity Recognition
Device & Channel Management

Biometrics "negotiation"

2. Context Identity

Transaction Id

Semantic Security

User-controlled
On-card Biometrics

Method of Virtualisation Method of Identification Method of Authentication Method of Accontability Positive Credentials Negative Credentials

Dynamic
Security Resolution
and negotiation towards
Application Risk Profile

User control of Device & Channel Management

Non-linkability

NO "TRUSTED" Part

Accountability

Biometric Enrollment

NO storage of certified biometrics outside user control

1. Root Identity

National Id TransNational Id

SRC'07 - Security Innovation & Technology

Dynamic Security Escalation Least invasive means by default



Biometric Id & Surveillance

(last resort)

National Id

(Singular Id)

Trusted Id

(Trusted party)

Trustworthy Id


(Transaction Accountable)

Credential Id

(specific credential proofs)

Local Id

(anonymous handle)



Negative credentials
(each present NOT on a fugitive-list)

Normal


Heightened

Critical

Threat Status


The Security Gap eliminated with Citizen Empowerment





Design for CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT EU COM 2007(96) on RFID





- Ability to create a new key and TRANSFER CONTROL to Owner
- Change to stealth Mode where RFID remain silent until authenticated
- Owner communicate with RFID without leaking identifiers
- Integrity & confidentiality dangerous goods, data on chip (transport)
- RFID still hold keys to validate product authenticity & safety
- In supply chain smart barcode. In use part of critical infrastructure


In mass production





Securing RFID in Passports


(User control of activation & passport revocation)





Dangerous Goods


• Case: DGM-SS for Dangerous Goods Management





Healthcare Emergency / disaster

Stepwise RFID-based one-time-only Identification




Balance by Design

Aviation



 Different data areas on the RFID can have its own Access Key(s) with associated Read and/or Write Access rights



- Secure read/write data provided
- No unauthorised access to RFIDs
- Part originality can be checked

- The Service Mechanic can;
 - Read and Write the Scratch Pad and the Service Records
 - Read the Current Record and the Birth Record
 - If specifically authorised to this, then update the Current Record

Dynamic Security Context/ Semantic Security Resolution



User Identity Devices – Control Context

Ability to establish new, manage and negotiate trustworthy Identity Ability to manage channels (receiver-controlled, id & purpose specific) Shut-down capabilities critical to security

Slave Devices – Adapt to user control

Protocols that do not leak identifiers – identity is deliberate Under user control – complex rules/negotiation/usability problem

Security Context Resolution

Negotiate Id root, authentication level, credentials, accountability Threat alerts dynamically raise requirements AND invasiveness

Application Security Management

Define security requirements and thresholds Resolve interoperability rather than identify users and devices Balance Requirements through multi-key

- End-user control
- Provider liability / SLA
- Fraud prevention
- Value creation

Security resolution based on WHAT you are rather than WHO you are

PR!WAY Security in Context

From Protection to Security by Design

- Central control as Security Paradigm is unsustainable
 - We create the vulnerabilities that lead to abuse
- The Critical Trust Ecosystem is getting polluted
 - Focus on value-creating activities Government & Trade
- The devil is in the design of technologies
 - Starting with the way we design National Id!
 - New technologies blinded certificates, On-card, semantics
 - FOCUS: End-user Control of Devices, Channels & Context Id
- Move to Empowerment & Distributed Dependability
 - Security by mutual Revocability. Innovation by Demand-pull
 - Security & Freedom two sides of the same coin